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Investment protection clauses, and the investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) mechanisms 
they enable, have become a common feature of international agreements on trade and invest-
ment. Intended to promote foreign investment, these protections may also discourage govern-
ments from regulating in the public interest. This raises challenging normative questions about 
the rights of investors and distributive justice. In this paper, I argue that a global investment 
regime that disadvantages developing countries and socially disadvantaged groups is prima 
facie unfair. This conclusion must be defended against the claim that investors have certain 
independent moral rights to have their property protected, regardless of the distributive con-
sequences. Granting the premise that such investor rights exist, I argue that these cannot plau-
sibly ground a general rule against public interest regulation that undermines the value of prop-
erty. I conclude that even if foreign investors have rights that must be safeguarded, the current 
investment regime must be reformed. 
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1. Introduction 
Transnational corporations and other private actors exert increasing influence over the 
formulation of policies that were once the sole province of sovereign states. Nowhere 
is this clearer than in the investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) mechanisms that 
have become part and parcel of many international treaties on trade and investment. 
Through these mechanisms, foreign investors are given a private adjudicatory channel 
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to challenge regulations that they perceive to breach treaty obligations, paradigmati-
cally through a violation of their property rights. A potential conflict between the pub-
lic interest and the rights of investors is thrown into sharp relief. 
 Consider the following cases. In 2007, a group of European investors launched a 
dispute against South Africa, which, as part of a positive discrimination law intended 
to mitigate the economic legacy of Apartheid, required mining companies to transfer 
part of their profits to black investors. The dispute was dropped a few years later after 
the claimants were given mining licenses with substantially lower levels of divestment. 
In 2009, the Swedish energy company Vattenfall demanded over €1 billion in compen-
sation from Germany for imposing environmental restrictions on the construction of 
a proposed coal-fired power plant near Hamburg. The case was settled after the Ger-
man government agreed to soften the restrictions. In 2010, tobacco multinational 
Philipp Morris brought Uruguay before an arbitration tribunal for passing laws requir-
ing large graphic health warnings on cigarette packs, as well as other public health 
measures. The country spent $27 million in its defence—more than the compensation 
demanded by Philip Morris—and though the tribunal ruled in favour of Uruguay and 
ordered a partial compensation of its legal costs, many observers fear that the mere 
risk of litigation may exert a ‘chilling effect’ on other countries entertaining similar 
policies. 
 The investment protections that provide the basis for these lawsuits raise challeng-
ing normative questions. One of these questions concerns their distributive effect. For 
some, international investment agreements are a step towards a more integrated and 
efficient world economy. By incentivising foreign investment, the claim goes, invest-
ment protections are bound to benefit everyone, including capital-importing develop-
ing countries. For others, however, they are a way for transnational corporations to 
increase their profit margins by unravelling environmental, public health and labour 
standards that tend to benefit the worst off. What constitutes a fair distribution of the 
benefits and burdens of foreign investment? 
 There is also a second question. According to an influential view, investment pro-
tections are not simply tools to increase efficiency in global markets for capital, but 
protections of the moral rights of investors. The investment protections in the North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), for example, mirror the language in the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and it is increasingly common for arbitrators 
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to look to international human rights law to interpret substantive and procedural stand-
ards in the treatment of foreign investors (Isiksel 2016, p. 311; Kube and Petersmann 
2016). If investors have certain moral rights that investment agreements are meant to 
safeguard—in particular rights to property—then the fact that these agreements have 
unwelcome distributive repercussions may not be a decisive reason to reject them. 
Hence we must also ask about the content of the alleged moral rights of investors. 
 Although normative political theorists have in recent years begun to examine the 
global economy from many different angles, little attention has been paid to these 
questions.1 My intention is to help fill this gap. After providing a brief overview of the 
features of the modern global investment ‘regime’ (section 2), I examine it from the 
point of view of distributive justice (section 3). Drawing loosely on Aaron James’ work, 
I employ a constructivist methodology to weigh the benefits of investor protection 
clauses against their risks and harms. I suggest that developing countries are not likely 
to be major beneficiaries of these clauses, and the same is true in particular of the 
disadvantaged groups within these countries. This is a pro tanto reason to reject in-
vestment protection clauses from the point of view of justice. However, to draw this 
conclusion we must address the claim that these clauses protect natural moral rights 
to property (section 4). Drawing an analogy with the human right to migrate, I show 
that even if such rights exist, they cannot plausibly be thought to undermine the right 
of states to regulate in the public interest, as long as these regulations conform to the 
rule of law. The final section summarises. 
2. The Global Investment Regime 
 
Foreign investment law is one of the fastest growing and most dynamic areas of inter-
national law. There are now over 5,000 international investment agreements, including 
approximately 3,000 bilateral treaties, or BITs (Subedi 2016, p. 1). The first wave of 
these treaties dates back to the post-war period. In a climate in which newly independ-
ent developing countries sought to exercise sovereignty over economic matters, West-
ern investors increasingly came to see existing protections against expropriations in 
                                                 
1 There are a handful of recent exceptions, including (James2017); (Banai 2017) and (Dietsch 2017). 
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international law as insufficient. Starting with a BIT between West Germany and Pa-
kistan in 1959, thousands of investment treaties were signed by states around the 
world. Over time, investment protection provisions were also included in broader in-
ternational economic agreements such as the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA), the Energy Charter Treaty, or the proposed Trans-Pacific Partnership 
(TPP). Even as the outright expropriation of assets became rare, the number of invest-
ment protection clauses soared, for they were now seen to protect foreign investors 
from indirect risks associated with changes to the regulatory environment in host 
countries.2 
 One of the most remarkable developments within the proliferation of international 
investment agreements is a transformation in the mode of business dispute resolutions. 
In early BITs, disputes about the treatment of foreign investors were either submitted 
to the International Court of Justice, or solved between the governments of the host 
country and the investor’s country. Gradually, however, more investment agreements 
began to include mechanisms of dispute settlement by arbitration between host coun-
tries and foreign investors. What was once an international affair became truly trans-
national: private actors were given the right to take countries to court directly if treaty 
obligations were (thought to be) violated. This is a right investors have been increas-
ingly keen to exercise. Only 43 investor-state arbitrations had been initiated up until 
the late 1990s, but there have been over 800 since the year 2000.3 While this may still 
be a modest number—at least in relation to the overall volume of investment flows—
the trend clearly points upwards. 
 The respondents in these cases are usually developing countries; the claimants typ-
ically transnational corporations. Significant sums of money are often at stake: in one 
of the largest and most publicised cases, for instance, Ecuador was asked to pay $2.3 
billion in damages to a US oil company.4 This sum has since been renegotiated to $1 
billion, but this still represents around a quarter of the Ecuadorian government’s total 
                                                 
2 For a brief historical account of the development of international investment law, see (Dolzer and 
Scheuer 2012, Ch. 1). 
3 See the United Nation Conference on Trade and Development’s (UNCTAD) Investment Policy 
Hub, available at: http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/ISDS (accessed May 15, 2018). 
4 The company, Occidental Petroleum, had breached Ecuadorian law by selling off drilling rights with-
out the government’s permission, prompting the latter to seize their oil fields. Although the arbitrators 
agreed that the government had acted lawfully, they nevertheless found that it had violated an Ecua-
dor-USA BIT. Occidental v. Ecuador, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/11, available at: 
https://www.italaw.com/cases/767 (accessed May 15, 2018). 
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yearly health expenditure.5 Because arbitration awards can be so consequential, the 
mechanisms of investment arbitration have come under scrutiny. Most disputes are 
settled under the rules of the Convention on Settlement of International Investment 
Disputes (ICSID Convention) or those of the United Nations Commission on Inter-
national Trade Law (UNCITRAL). The decisions are taken by a panel of three arbitra-
tors, sometimes in secret, and generally with little public scrutiny or accountability. 
Decisions are final and there is no right of appeal. The identity of arbitrators is a par-
ticularly controversial point: hired on a case-by-case basis, some arbitrators work as 
corporate lawyers for the same kinds of companies whose cases they hear, giving rise 
to worries of a ‘revolving door’ (Langford, Behn and Lie 2017). Of those arbitration 
decisions that have been publicised, about 37% have been decided in favour of the 
state and 28% in favour of the investor. In 23% of the cases, states have decided to 
settle.6 
 Unlike in the case of global trade, there is no multinational organisation that gov-
erns global investment, and the thousands of international investment agreements in 
existence are legally separate documents. Nevertheless, most observers speak of an 
emerging ‘regime’ in global investment, that is, a ‘set principles, norms, rules, and de-
cision making procedures around which actor expectations converge.’7 For one thing, 
investment protection provisions in different agreements are remarkably similar in lan-
guage and content, often down to the very same formulations. They typically include 
reference to a standard of ‘fair and equitable treatment’ of investors, for example, alt-
hough this standard is seldom further defined. Indeed, as one observer puts it, invest-
ment protection clauses are ‘breathtaking in their generality, vagueness and lack of 
specificity’ (Salacuse 2010, p. 453). This, in turn, leaves plenty of interpretive room for 
arbitrators, who effectively not only settle disputes, but further elaborate and thereby 
shape the very meaning of the treaties. It has also become common for arbitrators to 
                                                 
5 World Bank Open Data 2018. Available at: https://data.worldbank.org/country/ecuador (accessed 
May 15, 2018). 
6 UNCTAD Investment Policy Hub, available at http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/ISDS (ac-
cessed May 15, 2018). 
7 This is Stephen Krasner’s (1982, p. 185) classic general definition of a regime. For an application of 
regime theory to global investment, see in particular (Salacuse 2010). While it is sometimes said that 
the regime is not truly global due to a relative lack of BITs between capital-exporting countries, this 
seems to be changing as the latter are increasingly also becoming respondents of investor-state dis-
putes. Hence investment law is ‘developing toward an increasingly universal regime that can come into 
play independently of the sources and targets of foreign investment flows.’ (Schill 2009, p. 371). 
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reference arbitral decisions pertaining to different treaties. This progressive growth of 
investment case law ‘creates more opportunities for private actors to bring claims 
against sovereign states, gradually establishing a feedback loop that promotes further 
development of the regime, often in directions not envisaged by the signatories’ (Isiksel 
2016, p. 307).  
 Given this unpredictability, one may wonder why states are willing to sign up to 
the global investment regime. The most popular explanation, in particular with view 
to investment treaties between rich and poor countries, is that the regime is founded 
on a ‘grand bargain:’ ‘a promise of protection of capital in return for the prospect of more 
capital in the future’ (Salacuse and Sullivan 2005, p. 77). To put the same point some-
what differently, countries choose to increase their credibility in the eyes of investors 
by ceding part of their sovereignty. In doing so they also improve political relations 
between countries: BITs may be seen as a sign of good will, and they externalise dip-
lomatic tensions by allowing investors to settle disputes directly with host states. Other 
interpretations are less benign. Views associated with the realist school in International 
Relations, for example, see regimes as means for hegemonic powers to impose their 
strategic interests (e.g. Crawford, 1996). Yet another possibility is that the investment 
regime is neither the product of rational bargaining nor coercion, but rather a result of 
‘bounded rationality:’ when they signed investment treaties, many countries may have 
overestimated their benefits while underestimating (or entirely ignoring) the possible 
costs of ISDS (Poulsen 2015). 
 Regardless of why states sign investment agreements, there is an emerging global 
regime with significant legal, political and socio-economic repercussions. Alternative 
ways of structuring the regime have different distributive outcomes. Like with all so-
cially alterable arrangements that shape our lives, this raises the question of justice, to 
which I turn now.  
3. Distributive Justice 
Not too long ago, the literature on global justice seemed to offer a stark choice. Glob-
alists maintained that certain distributive principles applied to the global institutional 
order as a whole. The justice of particular social arrangements, such as those governing 
global investment, would then have to be judged by whether they promoted those 
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principles (for example, a Rawlsian difference principle applied to all people in the 
world). Statists, in contrast, were defined by their scepticism about the applicability of 
the concept of distributive justice beyond the state. Although the distributive impacts 
of international arrangements could still be seen as a matter of domestic or social jus-
tice, norms specific to the global realm were limited to human rights, and minimal 
procedural standards in the interaction between sovereign states. 
 This, of course, is a rather crude picture of the global justice debate. The reader 
will no doubt suspect my intentions, namely to show a third way beyond the dichotomy 
I have just set up. In broad brushstrokes: instead of thinking of the global realm as a 
single entity to which considerations of distributive justice either apply or don’t apply, 
we can look at individual global practices, institutions or regimes as separate sites of 
justice (see e.g. De Bres 2012). Some principles of justice will then apply to the rules 
that govern international migration, for example, other principles will apply to ques-
tions of global environmental justice, and yet others to the global intellectual property 
rights regime. We need not deny that there are linkages between these separate subjects 
of global justice, and that these will influence the content of their demands. But neither 
should this stop us from focusing on specific aspects of the global order in this plural-
istic fashion. 
 An influential example of how this approach might look is Aaron James’s book 
Fairness in Practice: A Social Contract for The Global Economy (2012). James proposes to 
understand the global economy as an independent social practice, one in which coun-
tries mutually rely on common markets for the purpose of increasing their national 
incomes. By integrating their economies, countries enjoy a claim to a fair share of the 
overall gains that the practice gives rise to. What fairness demands, in James’s account, 
is established through a constructivist moral methodology in the style of Scanlon 
(1998) and Rawls (1971). We consider all relevant interests at stake by imagining what 
principles for the global economy would be chosen behind some suitably designed veil 
of ignorance. James claims that the resulting principles would be substantially egalitar-
ian: not only should the gains from international cooperation be distributed equally 
among countries, citizens within each country ought to receive an equal share of their 
country’s share. 
 We need not agree with all aspects of James’s account to appreciate the usefulness 
of the general approach. First we identify and interpret the social meaning of a given 
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practice: the global economy, or more specifically, the global investment regime.8 Then 
we put ourselves in everyone else’s shoes, as it were, to see how the practice might be 
structured fairly in light of its meaning. Again, I do not necessarily think that we must 
accept James’s strongly egalitarian principles. But through the exercise of identifying 
the morally relevant interests at stake, and imagining what terms would be acceptable 
to each party involved, we get a good idea of what would certainly not count as a fair 
global investment regime. In other words: we need not find principles for an ideally 
just regime but may instead merely highlight arrangements that participants in the prac-
tice could reasonably reject as unjust. That is the approach I want to pursue here. 
 Let me begin with the rather banal observation that the practice of foreign invest-
ment is meant to be beneficial to all parties involved. Investors stand to make a profit 
by bringing their capital to countries with favourable conditions for a high rate of re-
turn; host countries can hope for skill and technology transfers, economic growth, and 
more jobs. That, in essence, is the basis of the bargain. Now, without any kind of 
assurance towards investors, host countries would hold the upper hand: once the in-
vestment had sunk in, they could expropriate assets, increase tax rates, revoke licenses, 
and so on. Investment protections are therefore designed to level the balance of power. 
And to that end, host countries must give up something: they must make assurances 
to investors that limit their own freedom of action. 
 A first thing to note is that, for the bargain to be fair, the costs of incentivising 
foreign investment must arguably stand in relation to the benefits. It is an empirical 
question just how much investment treaties really attract investment. Perhaps surpris-
ingly, the evidence shows a rather mixed picture. While some studies predict that coun-
tries can double their share of foreign investment by signing many BITs (Neumayer 
and Spess 2005), others are more sceptical. Countries with weak domestic institutions 
have not received significant additional foreign investment, for example, and in those 
with strong institutions, the causal effect of investment treaties is unclear (Hallward-
Driemeier 2003; Yackee 2008). The promise of ISDS is certainly not always decisive. 
In the opinion of a former acting US Trade Representative, for example, ‘investors 
                                                 
8 James (2017, p. 207) understands the global investment regime, together with the global trade regime 
built around the World Trade Organization (WTO), as ‘expressions of a common underlying eco-
nomic practice.’ But even if we want to analyze the investment regime separately, our conclusions are 
not likely to differ much: Investment, like trade, is a practice designed to augment national incomes, 
and the relevant actors and interest at stake are largely similar. 
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rarely, if ever, enter a foreign market because of ISDS protections’ (Sapiro 2015, p. 
20). 
 Regardless of whether any individual country can benefit from signing investment 
treaties, however, for the practice as a whole, at least some of the benefits will take the 
form of a zero-sum game. To be sure, the liberalisation of capital flows is likely to lead 
to some absolute economic gains. Under an efficient investment regime, where capital 
can seek out the highest rate of return, more investments will be made than under an 
inefficient alternative. In this sense, the total volume of investments is endogenous to 
the investment regime in place. But there are limits to this argument. For one thing, 
some investments are site-specific—think of natural resource extraction—and in these 
cases the mobility of capital is limited. Furthermore, capital is scarce, and countries 
compete for foreign investment. A credible assurance of investment protection may 
be a competitive advantage for any single country, but once all countries make similar 
assurances, the collective effect is a bidding contest that drives up concessions towards 
investors.  
 As Andrew Guzman has argued, international investment agreements take the 
form of a prisoner’s dilemma for developing countries. While it may be preferable to 
sign a BIT with a capital-exporting country rather than to miss out on possible invest-
ments, a worldwide network of investment agreements is a worse outcome than a 
world in which no investment agreements existed. Even if an efficient global investment 
regime brought a total increase in welfare, it is likely that ‘this gain will be outweighed 
by the loss those countries will suffer as they bid against one another to attract invest-
ment’ (Guzman 1998, p. 688). In a competitive market for capital, most of the benefits 
of investment will go to the investor, and not to the host states – in particular not to 
those who depend heavily on foreign capital, namely developing countries.9 It is these 
countries that have strong reasons to reject a global investment regime that is heavily 
skewed in favour of the investor. 
 The claim here is not that investors and host countries must profit equally in order 
for the global investment regime to be fair, let alone that developing countries must 
be offered the best possible terms. Rather, the point is that the current regime must at 
least produce a net benefit for its least advantaged participants. Developing countries 
                                                 
9 As Beth Simmons (2014) has shown, the weaker a developing country’s own economic prospects, 
the stronger the constraints on its freedom of action it is willing to accept. 
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can reasonably reject any arrangement that renders them worse off in relation to this 
minimal baseline. This would be the case if the benefits of investment treaties were 
negligible, as some of the literature suggests, or if modest benefits were outweighed by 
the costs of concessions towards investors. If either of these empirical claims is true, 
the current investment regime could not be justified to some of its participants. Note 
that this is a modest claim. With regard to the global trade regime, for instance, it is 
often argued that people in developing countries benefit from liberalisation even if 
they suffer exploitation or other disadvantages (e.g. Van der Vossen and Brennan, 
forthcoming). Because of the undeniable welfare gains that free trade produces, people 
are better off than they would have been without the global trade regime. Whatever 
one makes of this argument (and one might well think that it sets too low a baseline), 
it is doubtful whether it can be applied to the global investment regime.  
 A further concern arises when we look not only at the distribution of costs and 
benefits between investors and host countries, but also at the distributive effects within 
the latter. So far I have been writing about the costs to host countries in a rather ab-
stract way. There are, of course, the concrete costs of compensating investors when 
arbitration tribunals find fault with certain policies – costs, as we have seen, that may 
sometimes amount to billions of dollars. But perhaps more importantly, host countries 
also make concessions to investors by restricting their own policy space and ceding 
part of their sovereignty through ISDS. Policy space and sovereignty may or may not 
be intrinsically valuable, but they certainly have an instrumental value: freedom is al-
ways freedom to do (or not to do) something. And the options that are foreclosed or 
made more costly by investment protection clauses may benefit or disadvantage people 
within a given host country to different degrees. In other words, the design of the 
global investment regime has distributive implications within host countries as much 
as across them. 
 Recall that investment protection clauses are meant to protect not only against the 
direct expropriation of assets, but also what is known as ‘indirect expropriation,’ that 
is, measures and policies that have the effect of undermining the value of the invest-
ment. Typical examples are environmental and labour laws. In developing countries, 
lower standards in these areas often constitute part of the economic potential that the 
host country offers. That in itself may be good. But it becomes problematic when 
investment treaties have the effect of locking countries into these lower standards, 
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since the protection of investors’ ‘legitimate expectations’ can be interpreted as part of 
a ‘fair and equitable treatment.’ Take for instance the case of Tecmed, a Spanish com-
pany that had purchased a landfill facility near Hermosillo, Mexico in 1996. At the time 
of the purchase, there were national environmental regulations in place that required 
landfills to be located at a minimum distance to major settlements. Though the landfill 
facility in question violated them, these regulations were never enforced. However, 
after the purchase by Tecmed, a newly elected local government, responding to sus-
tained protests from local residents, decided to revoke the company’s license. Tecmed 
filed a claim under a Spain-Mexico BIT, and the tribunal confirmed that the claimant 
could have legitimately expected the regulation not to be enforced.10 
 Granted, investment treaties also typically contain public interest provisions, ex-
empting host countries from paying compensation for passing reasonable and neces-
sary legislation affecting public safety, health, or morals. Yet like the ‘fair and equitable 
treatment’ standard, the vagueness of these provisions leaves much room for interpre-
tation to the arbitration tribunals. Even when arbitrators uphold the state’s right to 
legitimate regulation, the uncertainty of their decision-making may already be a risk 
and a deterrent to any government entertaining the policies in question (see e.g. De 
Ville and Siles- Brügge 2016). 
 What makes this problematic from the point of view of distributive justice, of 
course, is that the largest potential beneficiaries of public interest regulations are the 
socially disadvantaged groups within the host countries. Labour legislation, such as 
minimum wage laws, often benefit the poor. Environmental legislation, such as re-
strictions on mining, often benefit rural populations. The investment regime may thus 
have the effect of improving profit margins for foreign investors at the cost of these 
groups. Furthermore, while investment protection clauses allow investors to pursue 
their interests through the ISDS system, no similar privilege is afforded to host coun-
tries, nor affected groups within host countries. Since investors are not signatories to 
international investment agreements—only states are—they cannot be taken to court 
for, say, breaching environmental standards or failing to pay taxes. As some observers 
have put it, the domestic equivalent of the global investment regime would be the 
                                                 
10 Tecmed S.A. v. The United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB (AF)/00/2. Available at: 
https://www.italaw.com/cases/1087 (accessed May 16, 2018). See also (Isiksel 2016, pp. 336ff). 
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reinstatement of property requirements as a condition of voting rights: ‘only those with 
capital […] have a voice’ (Garcia et al. 2015, p. 875). 
 In sum, the distribution of benefits and burdens in the global investment regime 
stands in need of justification. It seems clear that foreign investors are the major ben-
eficiaries of the current arrangements. That in itself may not necessarily be unfair, as 
long as the economic pie as a whole is growing (see also Dietsch 2017). But when the 
effects of investment treaties on employment and growth are uncertain or marginal, or 
when the benefits to developing countries are outweighed by costs that are primarily 
borne by the worst-off, the latter can reasonably reject the terms of the regime. It is 
worth noting again that while this conclusion depends on empirical claims about the 
effects of investment agreements—about which the jury is still out—it does not de-
pend on adopting strongly egalitarian distributive principles along the lines of James’s 
theory. 
4. Investor Rights 
 
It might be objected that our discussion thus far has failed to address what is perhaps 
the central concern behind investment protection clauses. Rather than being simply 
instruments to incentivise foreign investment, the objection goes, these protections are 
meant to safeguard the moral rights of investors. If investors have independent rights 
not to be treated in certain ways, then it matters little whether or not others are likely 
to benefit from the recognition of these rights. We cannot allow foreign investors to 
be arbitrarily deprived of their property in the name of distributive justice, much like 
we cannot forcibly redistribute kidneys to those in need. In our pursuit of fair distrib-
utive outcomes, these rights act as ‘side-constraints,’ to use Robert Nozick’s well-
known expression. 
 What kinds of rights do investors have? Investment agreements typically include, 
among other things, protections against discrimination and rights to a ‘fair and equita-
ble’ treatment. However, the core of the claim about investors’ rights is arguably the 
right to property. Since the concept of expropriation is commonly interpreted in such 
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a broad way as to include any unjustified threat to the commercial interests of inves-
tors, all these other rights can be thought to derive from the right not to have one’s 
property arbitrarily deprived. 
 This then immediately gives rise to a question about the nature of property rights. 
According to one view—long associated with John Locke—people have natural rights 
to their property, and these rights are conceptually prior to any legal or political ar-
rangement that recognises them. In a world in which there were no investment pro-
tection provisions, they would need to be invented. Call this the natural rights view. A 
second view, in contrast, holds that property rights only exist through the arrange-
ments that recognise them. As David Hume put it: 
 
Our property is nothing but those goods, whose constant possession is establish’d 
by the laws of society; that is, by the laws of justice. […] Tis very preposterous, 
therefore, to imagine, that we can have any idea of property, without fully compre-
hending the nature of justice (1978/1739, p.  491).  
 
From this point of view, we would need to know what a just global investment regime 
looks like in order to specify the content of investor rights. Call this the institutional 
view. 
 This latter view has recently been defended by Aaron James, for whom natural 
investor rights amount to what Jeremy Bentham would have called ‘nonsense upon 
stilts.’ Because investing in a foreign country is a kind of gamble, James argues, giving 
investors special protections is akin to allowing unlucky players to sue the casino for 
damages. No fair institutional arrangement would allow this. All that foreign investors 
can reasonably expect under a fair investment regime is not to be subjected to what he 
calls ‘infidelity.’ This includes being misled about the risks and prospects of doing busi-
ness in a country, and not being given a ‘fair warning’ about changes in the regulatory 
environment. Claiming rights to anything beyond that is simply nonsense, unless they 
are based on contractual obligations. But such obligations—if they amount to more 
than a guarantee against infidelity—would not be part of a just investment regime 
(James 2017). 
 As should be clear now, the conflict between distributive justice and the rights of 
investors all but disappears on the institutional view. This is so because the content 
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and the contours of property rights would need to be established in light of the dis-
tributive implications that these purported rights would have. Even though I am in 
principle sympathetic to this way of thinking about property rights, however, it seems 
to me that James’ argument takes the truth of the institutional view for granted. It 
leaves no room for the idea that there are certain universally valid standards that are 
not derived from an institutional framework that allocates rights and duties – an idea 
that seemingly underlies the widespread references to human rights in the discourse 
on foreign investment. 
 To illustrate what is at stake here, take the rather minimal rights against infidelity 
that James thinks would be accorded to investors in a fair investment regime. If these 
rights are all there is, investors can either accept the risks of moving their capital to a 
given country, or go elsewhere if they deem these risks too high. However, a proponent 
of the natural rights view would insist that investors enjoy certain rights wherever they go. 
A woman who accepts a job in a misogynistic society does not lose her human right 
to be treated in ways that reflect her equal moral status. A gay tourist travelling in a 
homophobic country does not thereby forfeit his human right to be free of discrimi-
nation on account of his sexual orientation. And foreign investors who invest in coun-
tries with shaky property rights records, so the argument goes, do not thereby give up 
any claims to compensation should they be wronged. Merely being warned about risks 
is not enough, for the risks themselves may constitute a violation of one’s rights. 
 That is the view that I want to examine. Instead of attempting to show the superi-
ority of the institutional view, I shall accept, for the purposes of the argument, that the 
natural rights view is correct. In trying to make sense of it, we can then explore what 
exactly the property rights of investors amount to, and how far they would take us in 
justifying the investment protection provisions discussed above. But in order to do so, 
we must first say a little bit more about the structure and justification of the right in 
question. 
 As is often pointed out, the right to property is not a single right but a bundle of 
rights (Honoré 1961). To own a sewing machine, for example, means to have a right 
to use it, to exclude others from its use, to keep the income it generates, to trade it for 
a piece of land, to give it away, and so forth. More importantly for our purposes, if 
investors have rights anything like the ones we are envisaging, the right to property 
would also include a right to move one’s property across borders, and to enjoy the 
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same bundle of rights there. Investor rights are rights to deploy one’s property without 
geographical limitations. Why should we think that the right to property extends in 
this way, especially given that under international law, sovereign states have the right 
to impose the terms under which foreigners conduct business in their jurisdictions? 
(Cf. Wenar 2016, pp. 106f.). Well, again, we are here entertaining the idea of a natural 
moral right to invest, which may well be in conflict with the political and legal institu-
tions that we take for granted today. 
 In order to have any moral right, I shall assume, it must be true that the right pro-
tects an interest that is weighty enough to place others under correlative duties (See 
Raz 1986). What interests are protected by the bundle of rights that we commonly 
associate with the right to property? One line of argument (associated, among others, 
with Hegel) emphasises the importance of private property for our ethical develop-
ment as free persons.  When we hold property rights over things, the argument goes, 
this secures ‘a sphere of personal jurisdiction, the right to acquire and hold the props, 
as it where [sic], with which to order one’s life’ (Machan 2001). A second argumentative 
strand (associated primarily with Locke) emphasises people’s interests in self-owner-
ship and the way it is extended to resources by mixing one’s labour with them. Having 
control over the things one has legitimately appropriated, on this view, is akin to having 
control over one’s own self.11 
 I shall not attempt to develop a detailed positive account of either of these argu-
ments in the context of global investment, nor to deal with the associated theoretical 
issues (among other things, the question whether corporate agents, such as transna-
tional corporations, can be said to have an interest in their ethical development). As a 
friendly gesture towards the proponents of investor rights, I shall assume these issues 
can be dealt with appropriately, and that there is a general link between freedom and 
the right to property that is worth protecting. I am happy therefore to shift the burden 
of proof to those who object to the economic liberties associated with the right to 
property. However, I want to show that even if we are sympathetic to the idea of 
natural investor rights, there are limits to what follows from them. To illustrate this 
point, I want to compare the right to property of investors—in particular their right to 
                                                 
11 For a thorough examination of these two kinds of arguments, see (Waldron 1990). 
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move their property across international borders—with another right that shows con-
siderable structural similarities, the alleged human right to migrate. 
 Some philosophers have argued in recent years that the freedom to move across 
borders is necessary to protect a fundamental interest in exercising a range of different 
life options. These options may relate, for example, to jobs, family and friends, or civic 
and political association with others. The fact that we need to move places in order to 
access these life options is commonly thought to justify domestic freedom of move-
ment, but since many life options lie outside the borders of our home state, the same 
logic would lead us to accept a global right to migrate (Oberman 2016; Carens 2013). 
Now, of course, such a right is not widely recognised within political philosophy (let 
alone outside it). But comparing and contrasting it to the right to invest may neverthe-
less give us some insight as to the possible nature and limits of the latter.  
Indeed, the argumentative structure of both purported rights is similar: they iden-
tify an important interest, show how it justifies a domestic right, and finally go on to 
‘globalise’ it by parity of reasoning. Beyond the structure of the argument, the content 
of the protected interest is similarly general in its appeal to freedom or liberty.12 And it 
is explicitly not understood along sufficientarian lines: it is not enough to offer merely 
an ‘adequate’ range of life options within a geographically constrained area, according 
to the proponents of the human right to migrate. Only a global interpretation is 
thought to satisfy the interest at stake. Similarly, the logic of the right to private prop-
erty does not imply any geographical limit as to where we may use it, transfer it, alienate 
it etc. This should not surprise us, of course, since we have defined these rights in a 
pre-institutional or pre-political way. 
 And yet, the fact that these rights are understood as pre-political cannot mean that 
their precise content or value is independent from politics. Consider, for example, how 
the human right to migrate must presuppose some account of the sorts of entitlements 
that immigrants are to enjoy in their countries of destination. Surely the right to migrate 
would be meaningless if states imposed no restrictions on entry, but then consigned 
all new arrivals to rat-infested dungeons (See Miller 2016). On the other hand, the 
proponents of the right do not claim that in order for it to be realised, all immigrants 
                                                 
12 It is interesting to note that freedom of movement and of capital are two of the four basic freedoms 
of the European Union. They are usually presented as inseparable, and the discourse of at least some 
politicians in Brussels suggests that this is not merely on economic, but also moral grounds. 
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must immediately be given the full set of privileges that citizens enjoy. Between these 
two extremes, there is a number of plausible scenarios that are compatible with the 
purported human right to migrate. What precisely the terms of membership are will 
be decided by the receiving society through their own political means. And we can 
even go further: it is precisely the fact that different societies make different political 
choices that creates the diversity in ‘life options’ that the right to migrate is meant to 
secure access to. 
  I think that something similar can be said about investor rights. If there is a natural 
right to property, its value cannot be insulated from the political and legal environment 
in which property is held. To be sure, if an investor buys a piece of land in a foreign 
country only to have it expropriated without any explanation shortly thereafter, her 
rights have been violated. Or, like the immigrants in the rat-infested dungeons, she is 
holding a meaningless right. But imagine that the authorities in that foreign country 
decide, through democratic means, to restrict the use of land for hydraulic fracturing 
(‘fracking’) near residential areas. Let’s also image that that was the primary intent of 
the investor. Has her right to property been violated? It would not be accurate to say 
that she no longer owns the land. Out of the bundle of rights that her property gives 
rise to, she still enjoys all but one (i.e. the right to use it specifically for fracking). Still, 
the question is whether this change in the regulatory environment is wrongful. 
 Consider now a different example. Imagine someone invests in real estate near a 
prison, anticipating profits from renting homes to correction officers. Somewhat later, 
the harsh and discriminatory drug laws that were in force at the time of the investment 
are repealed, resulting in fewer inmates and less demand for housing.13 Here too, the 
value of the investor’s property decreases because of a change in the regulatory envi-
ronment. But I think that in this case we are more confident in ruling out any violation 
of property rights. The example goes to show that virtually any change in the back-
ground rules that govern a society can affect the value of people’s property (positively 
for some and negatively for others). To construe this as a violation of the right to 
private property is effectively to demand a form of legal and political stasis that is not 
only undesirable, but practically impossible. We may also add that, like in the case of 
the human right to immigrate, there is something self-defeating about such a demand. 
                                                 
13 I borrow this example from Waldron (2012, p. 71). 
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From the point of view of investors, it is precisely the diversity and the changing char-
acter of regulatory environments that create business opportunities. 
 What natural property rights do seem to entail, however, is that changes are 
brought about in ways that are not arbitrary or discriminatory. If the law banning frack-
ing were tailored specifically to disadvantage foreign investors, it would be easy to see 
therein a wrongful attack on the kind of investor rights we are considering. But if the 
changes are brought about by procedures that are clear and transparent, laws that are 
formulated in general terms by legitimate law-making bodies, and interpreted and ap-
plied by independent judiciaries—in short, when these changes conform with the rule 
of law—it is hard to see an inherent conflict between regulation and property. Such a 
system, furthermore, is also able to determine fair compensation when appropriate. 
Indeed, it is along these lines that the right to property in the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights is commonly interpreted: not as an imperative to homogenise the back-
ground constraints that regulate the possession and transmission of property in differ-
ent legal systems, but rather as a general protection from legal arbitrariness (Cheneval 
2006, p. 15).14 
The rule of law is a more demanding standard than the one proposed by James. By 
ruling out only cases of infidelity, his account denies that investors are owed anything 
beyond a fair warning about the risks of moving their capital to a given country. The 
point of view of natural property rights, in contrast, demands a certain standard of 
legality even if the country in question is well known for failing to live up to it. It is true 
that investment is always a gamble. But the only risks that investors must accept on 
the view that we have sketched are those that do not arise from violations of their 
rights. All this notwithstanding, the point I have been making is that if we accept that 
there are natural investor rights (which James denies), it does not follow that changes 
to the regulatory environment will always violate those rights. 
 Let me now try to move back from this rather abstract discussion to the more 
applied question of investment protections and ISDS. I have suggested that the idea 
of natural investor rights does not rule out regulatory changes that undermine the value 
                                                 
14 See also the 5th Amendment of the US Constitution: ‘no person […] shall be deprived of life, lib-
erty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use with-
out just compensation.’ 
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of the investment, as long as these changes meet certain standards commonly associ-
ated with the rule of law. Of course, it would take more space than I have here to 
specify just what kind of standards these are. But let us suppose that at least some 
countries meet these standards, providing investors with a non-arbitrary and non-dis-
criminatory business environment (including, for example, the possibility to appeal to 
independent courts against any perceived infringement of their property rights.) When 
countries that meet these standards sign investment agreements, it is not clear why 
respecting investor rights would require any further assurances. To take a recent ex-
ample, many observers have doubted whether the Comprehensive Economic and 
Trade Agreement between the European Union and Canada (CETA) needs to include 
the ISDS mechanism, given the relatively high rule of law standards of all countries 
involved. 
  There are, of course, also harder cases. When countries cannot guarantee non-
arbitrary and non-discriminatory business environments, the idea of natural investor 
rights does seem to suggest that a just global investment regime ought to include mech-
anisms that compensate for this shortfall. It does not follow, however, that ISDS in its 
current form is fit for this purpose. For if one of the rationales for protecting invest-
ments is the unpredictability of some governments, the same problem arises with ar-
bitration tribunals. Consider, for instance, the two ISDS claims that were launched 
against the Czech Republic under a Czech-Dutch BIT in 2003. The first was brought 
by the owner of large media company; the second by the company itself. Although the 
circumstances of both claims were identical, the arbitration tribunal in the first case 
dismissed the claim out of hand, whereas the other arbitration tribunal found that the 
Czech Republic had grossly violated treaty obligations and was thus to pay $353 million 
in damages (See Sweetland Edwards 2016, pp. 70ff.). There is nothing approximating 
a consistent and coherent jurisprudence in arbitration case law. 
 Similar assessments can be made with regard to other features that we associate 
with the rule of law: transparency, openness, independence, accountability, appellate 
review, and so on.15 If there are natural investor rights, securing them in countries with 
weak institutions would require the creation of global mechanisms that could live up 
to these standards. ISDS in its current form does not seem to be answer. Now, one 
                                                 
15 For a comprehensive critique of ISDS on these grounds, see (Van Harten 2007, Ch. 7). 
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might argue that if investor-state arbitration has a business-friendly bias, it may at least 
compensate for the insufficient protection of property rights in host countries, even if 
it does not itself advance the rule of law. But to the extent that it overcompensates, it 
could not be justified on the basis of natural property rights. At the same time, as we 
saw before, it could be rejected by other parties on the ground of distributive fairness. 
5. Conclusion 
The emerging norms and rules that govern foreign investment raise important worries 
that merit our attention. One of these is the way investment protection clauses, and 
the ISDS mechanisms they contain, impact host countries and their citizens. Though, 
compared to other areas of global justice, investment protections may still seem a ra-
ther marginal concern, they are indicative of a broader shift towards corporate interests 
in global and domestic politics. And this shift may involve distributive implications 
that stand in need of justification.  
Following a broadly constructivist understanding of justice, I examined how in-
vestment protection clauses affect the relevant interests at stake. While some assurance 
towards investors is likely to lead to efficiency gains that benefit all, current ISDS prac-
tices seem to benefit investors above all. Developing countries that rely heavily on 
foreign capital are left with little choice but to grant maximal concessions to investors. 
And the costs of these concessions are primarily borne by the least advantaged social 
groups, who are typically beneficiaries of the public interest regulations that investors 
are wont to challenge. Even if we do not accept egalitarian principles in the distribution 
of gains and losses from global economic cooperation, the ‘grand bargain’ between 
investors and host countries seems worryingly one-sided. 
 A central objection to this line of argument is that investors enjoy certain pre-
political moral rights to have their property protected. From this vantage point, invest-
ment protection clauses are not something to be calibrated in light of their distributive 
effects, but rather an absolute requirement of a fair investment regime. But even if we 
accept that such rights exist, I argued, they cannot plausibly be understood to rule out 
policies and regulations in the public interest. The value of property rights is always 
linked to the background rules that govern a society, and it is both undesirable and 
impossible to expect those rules never to change. What can be expected, however, is 
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that regulatory changes conform to the standards we commonly associate with the rule 
of law. To the extent that ISDS falls short of these standards, it cannot be justified by 
appeal to the moral rights of investors. Yet it may be reasonably rejected by those who 
incur its costs. 
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